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COMMENT
ABORTION: FROM ROE TO AKRON,
CHANGING STANDARDS OF ANALYSIS
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court articulated its perception of
the fundamental constitutional right of a woman to choose to have an
abortion.' Throughout the decade that followed, two intertwined factors
have been of paramount concern in the abortion decisions: the health of
the mother and the protection of potential life. Statutory provisions aimed
at protecting these concerns have come before the Court with varying re-
sults. Although legislation interjecting third parties into the decisionmak-
ing process has been consistently struck down,2 attempts to regulate the
effectuation of the abortion decision have met mixed results.3 The Court
has held unconstitutional some legislation for minor variations in syntax,4
while other times markedly narrowing or broadening the application of a
1. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court first confronted a constitu-
tional challenge to state abortion statutes. Previously, the Court had used the term privacy
to cover a variety of values in personal, familial, marital, and sexual matters. See, e.g.,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (sterilization of
habitual criminals); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (child rearing and education).
These cases had established privacy as a constitutional value, which the Court in Roe inter-
preted to cover the abortion right. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-66. For a description of the evolu-
tion of the privacy right, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 921-34 (1978).
2. The Court has determined that the nature of the abortion right precludes the state
from imposing any third party in the decisionmaking process. Although the Court acknowl-
edges that some third parties have rights concerning the unborn child, the Court's analysis
requires the state to deny those parties their rights. For example, a state may not require
that a husband exercise his rights concerning the abortion or birth of his child. Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
3. See, e.g., infra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
4. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). At issue in Colautti was a Penn-
sylvania abortion statute that required the attending physician to preserve the life of the
fetus with the same care he would use if the fetus had been intended to be born alive. This
duty of care was imposed if the physician reached the conclusion that the fetus "may be
viable." The Court concluded that "may be viable" was intended to expand the concept of
viability set forth in Roe. Id. at 393. The Court has consistently held that the determination
of fetal viability is strictly a matter of the attending physician's medical judgment. Danforth,
428 U.S. at 64; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191 (1973). Colautti held that the concept of
viability may not be defined by the state and that neither the judiciary nor the state may
single out any particular factor as dispositive in determining when "potential life" begins.
439 U.S. at 397. Furthermore, the Court held that an abortion statute that fails to afford the
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law.5 Standards of review have ranged from strict scrutiny to rational ba-
sis.6 Consequently, the nature of the right has remained amorphous7 and
has been interpreted in different ways.8 The Court's uncertainty in this
area has left the states hard-pressed to legislate in furtherance of their le-
gitimate interests.
The persistent theme throughout the abortion decisions is the characteri-
zation of abortion as a medical procedure.9 Central to this theme is the
constitutional protection afforded a woman's ability to make certain deci-
attending physician broad latitude in determining viability and subjects him to criminal
liability is unconstitutional as overly vague. ld at 394, 401.
In Roe, the Court described the concept of viability in terms of that point in time when the
fetus is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." 410
U.S. at 160. This is a compelling point because the fetus "has the capability of meaningful
life. ... Id. at 163.
Commentators have criticized this concept because it is difficult to determine from a med-
ical standpoint. See, e.g., Comment, Towards a Practical Implementation of the Abortion
Decision. The Interests of the Physician, the Woman and the Fetus, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 676,
691 (1976).
5. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (construing a statute requiring notification of
a minor's parents to apply only to unemancipated, immature minors, living at home and
making no showing as to maturity); Doe, 410 U.S. at 192 (interpreting health to encompass
physical, mental and emotional aspects).
6. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57 (concerning absolute prohibition of abortions);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (a state is not obligated to fund costs incident to ob-
taining an abortion even though it funds costs incident to childbirth; such a statute has a
rational basis in the state's legitimate interests in fostering normal childbirth); Matheson, 450
U.S. at 413 (parental notification statute rationally related to a legitimate state end); see also
Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice. The Contributions ofthe Abortion-Fund-
ing Cases to the Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 721 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Beyond the Limits] (arguing that the abortion
right must be impinged upon by the state before state legislation is subject to strict scrutiny).
7. See generally Appleton, The Abortion-Funding Cases and Population Control. An
Imaginary Lawsuit (and Some Reflections on the Uncertain Limits ofReproductive Privacy),
77 MICH. L. REV. 1688 (1979); Goldstein, A Critique of the Abortion Funding Decisions: On
Private Rights in the Public Sector, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 313, 316-17, 342 (1981); Perry,
Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case:. A Brief Comment
on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113 (1980); Uddo, Victory at a Snail's Pace, 6
HUMAN LIFE REV. 27 (1980); Destro, Abortion and the Constitution. The Needfor a Life-
Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975).
8. Confusion as to the nature of the right is not limited to scholars; the justices them-
selves provide several widely differing interpretations. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 327-28 (1980) (White, J., concurring) (recognizing a right to be free from unreasonable
official interference with private choice); id. at 314 (Stewart, J.) (the right protects women
from unduly burdensome interference with the right); Maher, 432 U.S. at 481 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (Roe v. Wade forbids an absolute barrier to the freedom of choice); id (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (Roe creates an area of privacy invulnerable to the state intrusion with
the protected right); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (any state
interest is wholly insufficient to justify state interference with the right).
9. See infra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
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sions affecting her health.' 0 The woman's rights, however, are not absolute
and must be considered against the interests that the state has in the abor-
tion decision." Despite broad rhetoric to the contrary, the Court has re-
solved the conflicts between a woman's rights and the state's interest
through the application of a balancing test. 12 Recently, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of a state's ability to regulate the abortion proce-
dure in City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, Inc. " The
Court held that direct state interference in the physician-patient relation-
ship is outside the ambit of state authority,' 4 which is limited to legislation
that comports with "accepted medical practice."' 5 The Court's decision
marks an abandonment of a balancing approach and adoption of limita-
tions on state authority set by the medical community.
In Akron the Supreme Court confronted a municipal ordinance regulat-
ing various aspects of the abortion procedure.' 6 This ordinance required
that the attending physician make certain disclosures to his patient con-
cerning the nature and consequences of an abortion in order that her con-
sent to the operation be fully informed.' 7 The Akron provisions also
required that the abortion be performed no sooner than twenty-four hours
after the woman signed the consent form.' 8 In addition, the ordinance
required that all post-first trimester abortions be performed in a hospital
rather than a clinic."' Suit was brought challenging the ordinance as an
unconstitutional infringement upon a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion. The district court struck down certain detailed aspects of the
10. See Beyond the Limits, supra note 6, at 743 (reasoning that, under Roe, the state may
never subordinate its interest in maternal health to its interest in fetal life).
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154; see infra note 36.
12. 26 DRAKE L. REV. 716, 718 (1977); see infra note 30 and accompanying text; see also
infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
13. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983), affg inpart, rev'g in part, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981).
14. 103 S. Ct. at 2486.
15. Id
16. See id at 2488-89. The Court confronted five provisions, two of which are not dis-
cussed in the text of this comment. Section 1870.05 required that a minor woman's parents
be notified of the pending abortion. The Court held this provision invalid because it failed
to expressly create an alternative consent procedure whereby the minor would be guaran-
teed an effective opportunity to obtain an abortion. However, in Akron's companion case,
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983), the Court upheld a parental
consent requirement that provided an express, alternative means of obtaining consent. Ak-
ron also struck down § 1870.16, providing for the humane and sanitary disposition of fetal
remains, holding this provision void for vagueness. 103 S. Ct. at 2503-04.
17. Id. at 4769 n.5. The text of the informed consent provision is set forth infra note
113.
18. The language of the waiting period provision is set forth infra note 115.
19. The language of the hospitalization requirement is set forth infra note 112.
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disclosure requirement, but upheld the remaining provisions.2" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect
to the detailed disclosures, but with the exception of the hospitalization
requirement, invalidated the remaining provisions. The court held that the
invalid provisions encumbered the woman's right of privacy and were not
supported by a compelling state interest.2
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding all of
the provisions unconstitutional.22 The majority opinion, authored by Jus-
tice Powell, held that restrictive state regulation of a woman's right to se-
cure an abortion is subject to strict scrutiny and must be justified by a
compelling state interest.23 The Court further held that such legislation
must be narrowly drawn to protect only that interest.
Justice Powell prefaced the Court's opinion with an expression of re-
spect for the doctrine of stare decisis and asserted that the majority was
adhering to it in analyzing the issues of the case.24 Despite the Court's
purported adherence to stare decisis, the Akron decision denotes a substan-
tial departure from the precedent developed in prior abortion cases and
related privacy decisions. Although employing the broad rhetoric of the
landmark abortion case of Roe v. Wade, the Court substantially redefines
both the application of the analysis used in privacy jurisprudence and the
20. 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1203-06 (N.D. Ohio 1979). The district court stated that al-
though the state could constitutionally require counseling of abortion patients by either a
qualified counselor or the attending physician, the state cannot specify what information
must be given each patient. That determination, the court held, was left to the discretion of
the counselor. Otherwise, the physician would be placed in an undesirable and uncomforta-
ble "straight jacket." Id. at 1203.
21. 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981). The court of appeals upheld the hospitalization re-
quirement, citing the Supreme Court's affirmance of a three-judge district court decision
upholding a provision indentical to the Akron requirement. The court stated that "[tihe
Supreme Court has now had an opportunity to retreat from the 'bright line' drawn in Roe v.
Wade and has declined to do so." Id. at 1210. The case cited was Gary-Northwest Ind.
Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980), a f'd sub no. Gary-
Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 931 (1981). See infra note 129 and
accompanying text.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2504.
23. Id.
24. Justice Powell stated that "the doctrine of stare decisis while perhaps never entirely
persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society gov-
erned by the rule of law. We respect it today, and reaffirm Roe v. Wade." Id. But see
Justice O'Connor's dissent, where she argued that although the Court should be mindful of
the desirability of adhering to precedent, the Court has never felt constrained by it. This has
been so, she argued, because "[iln constitutional questions, when correction depends on
amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely exer-
cised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions." Id. at 2508 (quoting
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)).
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standard of reasonableness in order to achieve a desired result. As troub-
ling as the majority's reasoning is, the practical implications of the Akron
decision are even more problematic.
This comment will examine the validity of the Akron Court's claimed
adherence to stare decisis in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade. Part I
will examine the origins of the abortion right in Roe and then trace its
development through Roe's immediate progeny. Part II will analyze the
Akron decision. Part III will formulate a picture of the right that Akron
purports to protect and will compare it with the right as previously devel-
oped, concluding that the two rights are wholly incompatible.
I. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK
A. The Roe Framework
In the historic case of Roe v. Wade,25 the United States Supreme Court
first confronted the mutually antagonistic rights of the individual and in-
terests of the state as they pertain to the abortion decision. In Roe, a Texas
statute proscribed abortions for any purpose other than saving the life of
the mother. A pregnant single woman instituted a class action challenging
the constitutionality of the legislation. A three-judge district court struck
down the statute, holding that it was overbroad and infringed upon the
woman's right of privacy.26
On direct appeal the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the right of pri-
vacy sufficiently broad to encompass the decision by a woman whether or
not to end her pregnancy by means of an abortion.27 Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Blackmun cautioned that the right was a limited one to be
considered against important, countervailing state interests.28 The major-
ity viewed the woman's decision as a fundamental right. The Court there-
fore applied the principle that only a compelling state interest, pursued
through narrowly tailored legislation, could survive the strict scrutiny in-
yoked to assess a statute's constitutionality.29
Texas argued that its interest in preserving fetal life provided ample jus-
tification to uphold its restrictive legislation. The Court rejected this argu-
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, three rights were asserted: (I) the mother's; (2) the
state's; and (3) the child's. Although the Court squarely confronted the first two, it avoided
any discussion of the rights of the unborn by classifying it as a "potential life." Roe, 410
U.S. at 162. For a discussion of the impact of classifying the fetus as potential life, see infra
note 33.
26. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
27. 410 U.S. at 153.
28. Id. at 155.
29. Id.
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ment and proceeded to construct its now-famous analytical framework,
expressly intended to balance the state's interest against the privacy right
of the woman.31 Justice Blackmun articulated two important state inter-
ests: the preservation of maternal health and the protection of fetal life.
The Court's framework divided pregnancy into three trimesters. During
the first trimester no compelling state interest was considered sufficient;
therefore, the state had no authority to regulate abortions.3' At the outset
of the second trimester the state's interest in maternal health was deter-
mined to be compelling, and thus the state could regulate the procedure as
long as such regulation was reasonably related to maternal health.32 At
the beginning of the third trimester, the point at which the fetus was pre-
sumably viable, the state had a compelling justification for regulation-
protecting "potential" human life. 3 3 At this latter stage of pregnancy the
state could regulate abortions to the extent of proscribing them, except
where necessary to preserve maternal health.
34
Under this framework, the Court determined that the Texas statute's
absolute prohibition of abortion swept too broadly.35 The Court noted
that first trimester abortion was medically safer than the alternative of
30. The Court concluded that its analysis was "consistent with the relative weights of
the respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history,
with the lenity of the common law, and with the demands of the profound problems of the
present day." Id. at 165.
31. Id. at 163.
32. The Court provided examples of regulations it considered permissible during the
second trimester, including licensing requirements: as to the qualifications of the person
performing the abortion; as to the licensing of the facility in which the abortion would be
performed; and as to the nature of the facility in which the procedure would take place. Id.
33. While refusing to acknowledge the fetus as a human life, the Court adopted the
term "potential life" to describe the status of the fetus. The Court disposed of the argument
that fetal life constituted human life by an exercise in inverse logic. The majority stated
that:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are un-
able to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of
man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
Id. at 159.
As one scholar noted, the Court's classification of the fetus enabled it to define the con-
flicting rights and interests in terms of the state and the woman, leaving the rights of the
unborn out of the analysis. This classification of life as "potential" suggested that these
interests were somehow less than real. Relying upon "the concept of 'potential life' to define
the existence of the prenatal human organism, and by assuming that an individual's life
must be 'meaningful' before there is logical justification for protecting it, the Court was able
to compromise the interest of the unborn by defining away their rights." See Destro, supra
note 7, at 1253-54.
34. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
35. Id. at 164.
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childbirth.36 The Court concluded that the abortion procedure was in all
aspects a medical one, the responsibility for which lies with the
physician.37
In Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton,38 the Supreme Court con-
fronted a Georgia criminal statute restricting abortions to those deemed
necessary by the physician and imposing procedural requirements on their
performance. These requirements mandated that all abortions be per-
formed in hospitals licensed by the state and accredited by the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals; that the performance of the
abortion be sanctioned by the hospital's abortion committee; and that two
doctors concur in the attending physician's judgment as to the necessity of
the abortion.39 The district court found these requirements unconstitu-
tional because they improperly restricted the woman's right to have an
abortion.'
The Supreme Court modified and affirmed, construing the finding of
necessity to include the physician's assessment of the pregnant woman's
health. The Court defined health in terms of physical, emotional, psycho-
logical and familial factors, including considerations of the woman's age.4 '
Thus interpreted, the Court upheld the necessity requirement but invali-
dated the procedural provisions.
The Doe Court held the accreditation provision unconstitutional, noting
that no other type of surgery was limited to similarly accredited hospitals
and that the provision had no particular concern with abortion as a medi-
cal procedure.42 Although the majority acknowledged that some lower
courts had held similar accreditation requirements invalid as an overbroad
infringement of a fundamental right, Justice Blackmun avoided this ra-
tionale and employed a less stringent standard. The Court held the provi-
sion unconstitutional because it was not based upon differences reasonably
related to the statute's purpose.43 In addition, the majority struck down
36. The Court noted that the "State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion,
like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that insure maximum
safety for the patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the performing physician
and his staff. ... Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
37. Id at 166. According to the Court, where a particular physician abuses the privi-
lege of exercising "proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-profes-
sional, are available." Id.
38. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
39. Id at 183-84.
40. 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modifoed and afd, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
41. 410 U.S. at 192.
42. Id. at 193.
43. Id. at 194. The thrust of the Court's assertion that the provision was unconstitu-
tional centered on the failure of the state to require comparable accreditation in other medi-
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the hospitalization requirement because it applied to the first trimester.
The Doe Court held that the state is required to demonstrate that such a
requirement furthers its legitimate health interests."
The Court then considered the committee approval and two-doctor con-
currence requirements. It invalidated both provisions because of their sub-
stantial impairment of the woman's right to receive medical care according
to her physician's best medical judgment.45 The Doe Court rejected con-
tentions that the statutory delay was unconstitutional. Rather, the Court
found the consent requirements unconstitutional as they intruded upon the
physician-patient relationship.46 The Court reasoned that the interposi-
tion of a third party in the decisionmaking process was unnecessary. Jus-
tice Blackmun concluded that such impositions restricted the rights of the
woman and her doctor, while serving no rational purpose concerned with
the patient's health.47 Furthermore, he indicated that the statute intruded
upon a protected right of the doctor.4 8
Roe and Doe enunciated broad restrictions upon state powers to regu-
late abortions. These restrictions, however, were announced against a
backdrop of expansive state legislation. Consequently, the majority opin-
ions left a great deal of uncertainty with respect to the application of the
analysis and the nature of the physician-patient relationship.49
B. The Application of the Framework.: Danforth and Whalen
Three years later the Supreme Court refined the contours of Roe in
cal procedures, suggesting that had the state required similar accreditation for other medical
procedures, the requirement would have been upheld. This intimation was later made ex-
plicit in Danforth. See infra note 61. The Court's approach in this respect is in keeping with
Roe's definition of the abortion procedure as a medical one, since, under this approach, the
state is free to regulate it in the same way it regulates other comparable medical procedures.
44. Doe, 410 U.S. at 195.
45. The Court applied varying terms in assessing the degree of interference, including:
"unduly restrictive," "substantially limited," and "unduly infringes." Id. at 197-99.
46. Appellants had argued that the procedures required a discontinuance of the abor-
tion process by a median time of fifteen days. The Court rejected this argument, stating that
"[i]f higher risk was incurred because of abortions in the second rather than the first trimes-
ter, much of that risk was due to delay in application, and not to the alleged cumbersome-
ness of the system." Id. at 198-99.
47. In striking down the two-doctor concurrence, the Court again emphasized that no
other voluntary medical or surgical procedure was subjected to this requirement. Id. at 199-
200; see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
48. 410 U.S. at 197-99.
49. See, e.g., Georgius, Roe v. Wade. hat Rights the Biological Father?, I HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 251 (1974) (attempting to identify the prospective father's rights); Comment, An
Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Nebraska Abortion Statute, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 27
(1973).
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Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth." In Danforth, the
Court analyzed the constitutionality of abortion legislation enacted by the
State of Missouri. The statute required that a married woman obtain her
husband's consent during the first trimester, that a minor woman obtain
parental consent during the same period, that abortions during the second
trimester be performed by a method other than saline amniocentesis, that
facilities performing abortions keep certain records on the abortions that
they performed, and that a woman attest in writing that her consent was
freely given and was not the result of coercion.5' Two physicians and a
nonprofit corporation operating an abortion clinic challenged the constitu-
tionality of the statute. A three-judge district court held all the provisions
constitutional.52
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed with respect to the
spousal and parental consent provisions and the proscription of saline
amniocentesis, holding these requirements unconstitutional. The Court af-
firmed, however, the recordkeeping and informed consent requirements,
holding that they were reasonably related to maternal health. Writing for
the majority, Justice Blackmun held that a state may not require the con-
sent of either a married woman's spouse or a minor woman's parents.
Missouri had propounded a legitimate interest in strengthening the marital
relationship on the one hand and the protection of the welfare of minors
on the other. The Court acknowledged the state's strong and legitimate
interests, but reasoned that these interests were outweighed by the impact
of an unwanted pregnancy.53 It indicated that the state possessed more
expansive authority to regulate the conduct of children, a discretion the
Court observed was long recognized.54 Nevertheless, the Court concluded
that in neither case was the state justified in imposing what it described as
an "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" on the woman's right to
decide.55
The Court also invalidated the prohibition of the saline amniocentesis
50. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
51. Saline amniocentesis was described by the Court as a method or technique of abor-
tion "whereby the amniotic fluid is withdrawn and 'a saline or other fluid' is inserted into the
amniotic sac." Id at 76. This procedure then induces labor and the abortion occurs in the
form of a miscarriage.
52. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975), affidandrev'd
inpart, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
53. 428 U.S. at 71, 75.
54. "[A] State's permitting a child to obtain an abortion without the counsel of an adult
'who has responsibility or concern for the child would constitute an irresponsible abdication
of the State's duty to protect the welfare of minors.' "Id at 72-73 (citing Brief for Appellee
Danforth at 44).
55. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
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abortion technique, framing its analysis in terms of whether or not the
restriction reasonably related to maternal health.56 It assessed four signifi-
cant considerations: first, the widespread use of the proscribed method;
second, the limited availability of an allegedly safer alternative method;
third, the apparent prohibition of that alternative method under the stat-
ute; and, fourth, the fact that the remaining techniques were more danger-
ous to the woman's health than the one proscribed. 7 After evaluating
these factors, the majority determined that the provision was unreasonable
as a means of protecting maternal health because it both required abortion
by a more dangerous technique than the one proscribed and had the effect
of inhibiting the bulk of post-first trimester abortions.58
The Danforth Court demonstrated, however, that the sanctity of the first
trimester was not so absolute as Roe seemed to suggest. The Court upheld
the recordkeeping requirements despite the fact that they failed to exclude
the first trimester. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion deemed record-
keeping reasonably related to the protection of maternal health and con-
cluded that it was not legally significant in its impact on the abortion
decision. 59 Blackmun also upheld the requirement that a woman certify in
writing that her consent was informed and freely given, reasoning that the
abortion decision was both an important and stressful one and should be
made with full awareness of its nature and consequences.60 The Court
acknowledged that it was within the state's power to ensure that the con-
sent was informed and concluded that because a state may require such
consent in other surgical procedures there was no constitutional defect in
requiring it for abortions.6'
Roe, Doe and Danforth laid the groundwork for abortion jurisprudence.
Roe and Doe construct the basic analytical framework and identify partic-
ularly sensitive areas of the privacy right in the abortion context. Danforth
demonstrates the scope of the framework and more clearly articulates the
56. Id. at 76.
57. Id. at 77-78.
58. Id at 79.
59. Id at 81.
60. The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it
is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of
the decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the state to the
extent of requiring her prior written consent.
Id at 67.
61. "We could not say that a requirement imposed by the State that a prior written
consent for any surgery would be unconstitutional. As a consequence, we see no constitu-
tional defect in requiring it for only some types of surgery ... or, for that matter, for abor-
tions." Id
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reasoning behind the Court's varying dispositions of statutory provisions.
Under Roe, the state is absolutely prohibited from interfering with the
abortion decision or its effectuation. Danforth holds that certain regula-
tions affecting the first trimester are permissible. The confusion surround-
ing the state's authority in this area arises from the Danforth Court's
application of the reasonableness standard, instead of strict scrutiny, in
upholding the informed consent and recordkeeping requirements. The
concept of reasonableness in abortion regulation, then, becomes crucial in
attempting to reconcile these two opinions. In order to ascertain what con-
stitutes reasonable regulation of abortions, it is first necessary to define the
nature of the right involved.
The central focus of the early abortion cases was the right of the woman
to choose whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.62 This concern is
manifest in the refusal of the Court to permit either the state or third par-
ties to possess a potential veto on that decision. Roe's primary objection to
such interference was the adverse impact it placed on the woman's
health.63 Even in those instances where the protection of fetal life consti-
tutes a compelling state interest, the state may not forbid abortions neces-
sary to preserve the mother's health.' Health considerations provide the
underlying rationale for the holding in Roe that the state may not pro-
scribe abortions during the first trimester, the time during which mortality
rates for abortions are below those of normal childbirth.65 Doe made
clear, however, that the concept of health applied by the Court. was
broader than mere physical health. Instead, the Court held that a physi-
cian may consider the psychological and emotional factors as well.66
It is the distinction between the different aspects of health that reconciles
the conflicting holdings in Roe and Danforth concerning the state's ability
to regulate the abortion decision in the first trimester. The Roe Court was
concerned with the woman's freedom to make the decision. The rationale
offered by the Court in forbidding first trimester regulation was the physi-
cal detriment imposed on the woman if denied the opportunity to secure
an abortion.67 The Danforth decision, however, looks to the emotional
and psychological impact of the decision on the woman. The Danforth
Court, therefore, permits greater latitude in state action where the state is
62. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 (1978) (Roe does not favor abor-
tion; rather it prefers leaving the woman free to decide).
63. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
64. Id at 164.
65. Id at 149.
66. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 192.
67. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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concerned with the quality of the decision. In protecting this aspect of the
decision, the Danforth majority recognized that the state's interest in a wo-
man's welfare will support regulations which, at a minimum, treat abor-
tions in the same manner as other comparable medical procedures.68
The Danforth informed consent provision was an incident of direct state
regulation of the physician-patient relationship. Thus Danforth marks a
retreat from the language in Doe that purported to recognize an independ-
ent right of the physician to practice medicine. Shortly after Danforth, the
Court expressly denied the existence of such a right in Whalen v. Roe. 69
In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court confronted a challenge to a New
York statute requiring a physician dispensing dangerous drugs to com-
plete, in triplicate, official forms identifying the prescribing physician, the
name, age, and address of the patient, as well as the drug and dosage pre-
scribed.7° Under the statute the required information was then stored for a
period of five years in governmental computers.
Suit was brought on behalf of a group of patients and physicians, chal-
lenging the application of the act as an infringement on their constitution-
ally protected right of privacy. A three-judge district court enjoined the
application of the challenged statute. It held that as a zone of privacy, the
doctor-patient relationship is accorded constitutional protection. The dis-
trict court further held that the statute had a "needlessly broad sweep."'"
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute did not invade
any protected right or liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment.72
Addressing the assertions of the statute's challengers that it invaded a pro-
tected zone of privacy, the Court stated that the privacy right encompasses
two distinct interests. One is an individual's interest in independently
making certain types of important decisions and the other is an interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters. 73 The group of patients challeng-
ing the statute argued that both of these interests would be impaired under
its provisions. The Court rejected the first argument, noting that there was
68. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65-67.
69. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
70. Id. at 593. Whalen demonstrated that the Court was unwilling to recognize any
independent right in physicians to practice medicine. Indeed, the Court recognized that the
state had a legitimate concern in preventing physicians from overprescribing certain drugs
or giving one patient multiple prescriptions. Id at 592. Thus, Whalen stands in stark con-
trast to Akron's presumption that physicians are competent, conscientious and ethical. See
Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2502 n.39.
71. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
72. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04.
73. Id. at 599-600.
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no support in the record to provide an assumption that the statute would
be improperly administered. Instead, the Court indicated that there were
adequate safeguards to protect the integrity of the required information. 4
The Court also rejected the patients' contention that the recordkeeping
requirement would deter some individuals from seeking adequate infor-
mation. The Court reasoned that access to needed drugs was not deprived
under the statute, nor was it conditioned on the consent of any third
party.
75
The physicians argued separately that the statute constituted unwar-
ranted interference with their right to practice medicine.7 6 In support of
this right they relied on the opinion in Doe, where the Court indicated
approval of such a right. The Court determined, however, that disposition
of the patients' claims likewise disposed of that of the doctor. The Court
reasoned that the physician's right was merely derivative and, therefore, no
stronger than the patient's right. In a footnote, the Court explained that
the right protected in Doe was that of the woman. The restrictions were
invalid because they burdened the woman's right to decide and to rely on
her physician in making that decision. The Court stated that if the regula-
tions "had not impacted upon the woman's freedom to make a constitu-
tionally protected decision, if they had merely made the physician's work
more laborious or less independent without any impact on the patient, they
would not have violated the Constitution.,
77
Consistent with Danforth, Whalen recognizes that the physician's role in
the abortion procedure, as in other medical procedures, does not constitute
an independent right. Rather, the extent of constitutional protection af-
forded the physician is purely derivative. It does not exist, therefore,
above or beyond that necessary to ensure the woman's freedom to exercise
her right. More importantly, the state is justified in intervening and regu-
lating the relationship so as to protect its legitimate interests.
C Ensuring a Quality Decision.: Bellotti and Matheson
In Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I),78 the Supreme Court addressed the ques-
tion of what kind of consent an unmarried minor woman could be re-
quired to obtain prior to an abortion. A 1974 Massachusetts statute
required women under eighteen years of age to obtain the consent of both
74. Id at 601.
75. Id. at 603; accord H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
76. 429 U.S. at 604.
77. Id. at 604 n.33.
78. 428 U.S. 132 (1976). Bellottil was a companion case to Danforth.
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parents before obtaining an abortion.7 9 Suit was brought challenging the
statute's constitutionality on due process and equal protection grounds. A
three-judge district court held the statute unconstitutionally created a pa-
rental veto on the abortion decision of a minor woman."0 In the Supreme
Court the statute's challengers raised an additional argument that the con-
sent requirement impermissibly distinguished between minors seeking
abortions and those seeking other medical procedures.
8 '
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, determining abstention ap-
propriate because the statute was unconstrued by the state judiciary and,
therefore, susceptible to a construction that would render it constitu-
tional.82 But the Court did not avoid all discussion of abortion legislation.
The majority focused on the appropriate analysis to apply in assessing the
constitutionality of abortion legislation. The Court stated that the central
issue in Danforth was whether or not the statute in question unduly bur-
dened a woman's right to seek an abortion.83 In making this assessment
the Court concluded that the constitutionality of distinctions made be-
tween abortions and other medical procedures will depend upon the de-
gree of the distinction and the justification for it.84 In short, the Court
expressly adopted a balancing approach to the abortion analysis.
Bellotti (Bellotti 1I)85 came before the Court again in 1979, after the dis-
trict court had certified several questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. 86 As construed by that court the statute did not permit mi-
nors, whether mature or immature, to obtain judicial consent in place of
parental. Rather, the Massachusetts court held that parental consent was a
prerequisite for every nonemergency abortion performed on a minor. Ad-
ditionally, the court read the statute to require notice of any judicial con-
sent proceeding brought by a minor. Hence, the court allowed that either
the minor's parents or a court could override a judicial determination that
the abortion is in the child's best interest.8 7 Thus interpreted, a three-judge
district court held the statute unconstitutional.8
79. Id. at 134-35.
80. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D. Mass. 1975).
81. 428 U.S. at 149.
82. Id at 146.
83. Id at 147.
84. Id at 150.
85. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
86. Certification is a "[p]rocedure by which a federal court abstains from deciding a
state law question until the highest court of the state has had an opportunity to rule on the
question so certified by the federal court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 206 (rev. 5th ed.
1979).
87. Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.2d 288 (1977).
88. 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978).
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The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute unconstitutionally
burdened the minor's right to secure an abortion.89 Eight justices con-
curred in the judgment, but were divided in their reasoning. Justice Pow-
ell authored a plurality opinion that proceeded beyond the judgment to
discuss the relative weights of the minor's rights and the state's interests. 90
He recognized that the state's interest in the protection of its minor citizens
was a strong one and distinguished the rights of children from those of
adults. The plurality listed three factors they deemed determinative in
reaching their conclusion: the particular vulnerability of children; their
inability to make crucial decisions in a mature, informed manner; and the
central role of parents in child rearing. 9' Powell articulated the plurality's
inquiry as being whether the Massachusetts statute unduly burdened the
right of a minor to seek an abortion. 92
The plurality observed that because circumstances vary widely, an abor-
tion may not always be in a minor's best interest. 93 Justice Powell stated
that although an absolute, potentially arbitrary veto is never permissible, a
state may require parental consent only if it provides an alternative, judi-
cial means of obtaining the necessary authorization. 94 The plurality out-
lined the contours of this alternative procedure, requiring that a minor be
given the opportunity to show either that she is sufficiently mature to make
the abortion decision or that the abortion would be in her best interest. 95
Justice Powell concluded that the procedure must ensure anonymity and
be sufficiently expeditious to ensure that the minor would have an effective
opportunity to obtain an abortion.96
The plurality's opinion in Bellotti II effectively recognized the balancing
process begun in Roe, applied in Danforth and articulated in Bellotti I.
This process weighed the traditional interest of the state in protecting mi-
nors on the one hand against the privacy right of the woman on the other.
Despite the fact that the abortion decision was still seen as an essentially
medical one, the plurality's opinion recognized a particularly important
aspect of an abortion decision-that the exercise of the right assumes the
ability to make the decision.97 The complex regulatory scheme envisioned
89. 443 U.S. at 651.
90. Id. at 625-51.
91. Id. at 634-37.
92. The plurality noted that the alternatives of marriage, arranging adoption or assum-
ing motherhood may be in the minor's best interest. Id at 642-43.
93. Id at 643.
94. Id at 643-44.
95. Id at 644.
96. See id. at 642-43.
97. Cf infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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by the plurality is the logical corollary of the informed consent provision
in Danforth: both requirements centered on the quality of the decision
made. In Danforth the state's authority to ensure that a woman's consent
is informed is supported by the state's interest in promoting her ability to
independently make the abortion decision by requiring that all necessary
material information is provided to her. Similarly the immaturity of mi-
nors brings into question their ability to act in their own best interest. The
Bellotti1I plurality indicates that, in this circumstance, it is the province of
the state rather than the physician to ensure that the decision made is the
best one for the individual involved.
The Danforth rationale and the Bellotti corollary demonstrate that the
right of a woman to decide is not so much her freedom to decide affirma-
tively as it is her freedom to have the opportunity to make the ultimate
choice.9" Both opinions recognize that the protection of the woman's
health is within the ambit of state authority. These determinations, how-
ever, are in marked conffict with the authority of the physician as outlined
in Roe. The conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that the state, not
the physician, stands next in line after the woman in making certain that
the abortion decision will not endanger the woman's mental or emotional
health.
The discretion of the state in regulating the abortions of minors arose
again in HL. v. Matheson." In that case, the Court examined a Utah
statute requiring a pregnant minor's attending physician to notify, when
possible, the woman's parents or guardians of the pending abortion."° A
minor female, whose physician had advised her that an abortion was in
her best interest, was unable to secure an abortion because the physician
refused to perform it without notifying her parents. She brought a class
98. Compare Bellotti II and Danforth with L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
933 (1978) ("Roe v. Wade represents less a decision in favor of abortion than a decision in
favor of leaving the matter, however it might come out in particular cases, to women").
99. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
100. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978) provides:
To enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment [concerning the
abortion], he shall:
1. Consider all factors relevant to the well-being of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed including, but not limited to,
(a) Her physical, emotional and psychological health and safety,
(b) Her age,
(c) Her familial situation,
(d) Notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the
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action on behalf of unmarried minors who desired to terminate their
pregnancies without notifying their parents, but who were unable to do so
because of the statute requiring such notice. The Supreme Court of Utah
affirmed the trial court, holding that the statute restricted neither the mi-
nor's right to obtain an abortion nor her right to enter into a physician-
patient relationship.'0 '
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff
had neither alleged nor offered evidence to support her standing as a ma-
ture, emancipated minor.'0 2 The Court held the statute constitutional as
applied to an unemancipated minor, living at home and making no show-
ing of maturity.'0 3 It distinguished the requirement of notification from
the requirement of consent. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
rejected the contention that the statute was unconstitutional because the
state failed to require notification of a minor's parents in other medical
procedures.'°4
The Matheson Court reasoned that a state's interest in full-term
pregnancies was sufficient to justify the distinction made between abortion
and childbirth. It noted that the decision to carry a child to term entails
few or none of the grave psychological consequences of the decision to
abort.0 5 In protecting its citizens from such harms and promoting its own
interest, the majority emphasized that the state was not required under the
Constitution either to encourage or facilitate abortions. 0 6 Furthermore,
the majority determined that the provision promoted a valid state interest
in affording parents the opportunity to provide essential medical informa-
tion to attending physicians.'0 7 The Court concluded, therefore, that the
statute was reasonably related to the preservation of maternal health and
that its validity was not undercut by the possibility that its mandates might
101. H.L. v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979).
102. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 406.
103. Id. at 413.
104. 1d. The Court cited Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) in support of this statement.
In Maher, the Court reasoned that unequal treatment of abortion and other medical proce-
dures is justified because the latter "do not involve the termination of potential life." Maher,
432 U.S. at 480. But see Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 281, 449 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that abortion and childbirth are merely two alternative medical options avail-
able to a pregnant woman).
105. 450 U.S. at 412-13.
106. "The Constitution does not compel a state to fine-tune its statutes so as to encourage
or facilitate abortions. To the contrary, state action 'encouraging childbirth except in the
most urgent circumstances' is 'rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of
protecting potential life.'" Id. at 413 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1979)).
107. 450 U.S. at 411.
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inhibit some minors from seeking an abortion. °8
Matheson demonstrates that the state's interest in regulating the abor-
tions of minors is particularly strong. Legislation aimed at protecting that
interest may restrict that right to the extent of requiring parental notice.
As the dissent notes, however, a parental notification provision may consti-
tute a de facto impediment to a minor's abortion.0 9 Therefore, the state's
regulations, although they may neither prohibit abortions altogether nor
restrict the options ultimately available to a woman, may make the wo-
man's decision more difficult. This result is consistent with the traditional
role of the state in other areas of fundamental rights jurisprudence."' The
Matheson Court demonstrates that a certain amount of latitude must be
granted states seeking to protect their legitimate interests. Where these in-
terests are particularly strong, as in the state's desire to protect minors,
greater degrees of regulation are permissible. Perhaps most striking is that
the Matheson Court upheld the contested statute using a reasonableness
standard without invoking strict scrutiny or deeming the encouragement of
parental involvement to be a compelling state interest.
II. ALTERING THE ANALYSIS: CITY OF AKRON V AKRON CENTER FOR
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
In 1978 the City Council of Akron enacted a municipal ordinance enti-
tled Regulation of Abortions, containing seventeen provisions regulating
the performance of abortions."' Among its requirements, the ordinance
restricted all post-first trimester abortions to hospital, as opposed to
clinical, facilities. I" 2 Additionally, the city sought to ensure that the wo-
man's consent was informed and mandated that the attending physician
provide her with detailed information, including: anatomical and physio-
logical descriptions of the unborn fetus at different stages of development;
108. Id. at 413.
109. See id. at 437.
110. For a discussion of the traditional analysis of state action regulating fundamental
rights, see infra note 173 and accompanying text.
S11. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870 (1978) (cited in part in Akron v. Ak-
ron Center for Reprod. Health, 103 S. Ct. 3481 (1983)).
112. In a footnote, the Court cites the relevant portion of the Akron, Ohio city ordinance:
1870.03 ABORTION IN HOSPITAL
No person shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman subse-
quent to the end of the first trimester of her pregnancy, unless such abortion is
performed in a hospital.
Section 1870.1(B) defines hospital as a general hospital or special hospital de-
voted to gynecology or obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic Association.
103 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 n.3 (citing Akron, Ohio, Codified Ordinances §§ 1870.03 I(B) (1978).
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the complications and risks incident to an abortion procedure; and the
availability of several agencies providing birth control and adoption infor-
mation." 3 The ordinance also required the woman's physician to inform
her of the circumstances of her own pregnancy and the risks involved in
113. In a footnote the Court cites the relevant portion of Akron, Ohio's city ordinance
entitled Regulation of Abortion:
1870.06 INFORMED CONSENT
(A) An abortion otherwise permitted by law shall be performed or induced only
with the informed written consent of the pregnant woman, and one of her parents
or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with Section
1870.05(B) of this Chapter, given freely and without coercion.
(B) In order to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent,
an abortion shall be performed or induced upon a pregnant woman only after she,
and one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accord-
ance with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have been orally informed by her
attending physician of the following facts, and have signed a consent form ac-
knowledging that she, and the parent or legal guardian where applicable, have
been informed as follows:
(1) That according to the best judgment of the attending physician she is
pregnant.
(2) The number of weeks elapsed from the probable time of conception of
her unborn child, based upon the information provided by her as to the time of her
last menstrual period and after a history and physical examination and appropriate
laboratory test.
(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception
and that there has been described in detail the anatomical and physiological charac-
teristics of the particular unborn child at the gestational point of development at which
time the abortion is to be performed, including, but not limited to, appearance, mobil-
ity, tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain and heartfunction,
the presence of internal organs and the presence of external members.
(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus capable of surviving
outside of her womb, if more than twenty-two (22) weeks have elapsed from the
time of conception, and that her attendingphysician has a legal obligation to take all
reasonable steps to preserve the i4fe and health of her viable unborn child during the
abortion.
(5) That abortion is a major surgical procedure, which can result in serious com-
plications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual distur-
bances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and
that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psycho-
logical problems she may have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances.
(6) That numerous public and private agencies and services are available to
provide her with birth control information, and that her physician will provide her
with a list of such agencies and the services available if she so requests.
(7) That numerous public and private agencies and services are available to
assist her during pregnancy and after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to
have the abortion, whether she wishes to keep her child or place him or her for
adoption, and that her physician will provide her with a list of such agencies and
the services available if she so requests.
Id. at 2489 n.5 (citing ARKON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES §§ 1870.50(A), (B) (1978))
(emphasis added).
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the abortion technique to be employed."1 4 Finally, the ordinance imposed
a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period between the signing of the
consent form and the performance of the abortion, applicable in all non-
emergency situations.' 5 Noncompliance with any of the provisions was
punishable as a criminal misdemeanor.
Three corporations operating abortion clinics in Akron, as well as a phy-
sician who had performed abortions in one of those clinics brought suit
against the city. The district court held the detailed disclosure provision
invalid, but upheld the remaining requirements." 6 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part, holding all provisions unconstitutional, with the exception of a re-
quirement that all abortions be performed in a hospital as defined by the
statute. ' 17
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that
all of the provisions unduly burdened a woman's right to an abortion.
' 8
The Court reasoned that the scope of the abortion right was determined by
its nature as a medical procedure. Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
stated that full protection of a woman's right requires that the attending
physician be given substantial freedom in the decisionmaking process and
in the performance of the abortion." 9 The Court retraced the three-stage
114. The Court again cites the relevant section of Akron's city ordinance in a footnote:
(C) At the same time the attending physician provides the information required
by paragraph (B) of this Section, he shall, at least orally, inform the pregnant wo-
man, and one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in
accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, of the particular risks associ-
ated with her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed including
providing her with at least a general description of the medical instructions to be
followed subsequent to the abortion in order to insure her safe recovery, and shall
in addition provide her with such other information which in his own medical
judgment is relevant to her decision as to whether to have an abortion or carry her
pregnancy to term.
1d. at 2489 n.5 (citing AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.05(C) (1978)).
115. The Court quotes an additional relevant section of the Akron, Ohio city ordinances:
1870.07 WAITING PERIOD
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman until
twenty-four (24) hours have elapsed from the time the pregnant woman, and one of
her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with
Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have signed the consent form required by Sec-
tion 1870.06 of this Chapter, and the physician so certifies in writing that such time
has elapsed.
Id. at 2489 n.6 (citing AKRON, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.07 (1978)).
116. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D.
Ohio 1979), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981).
117. 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), aftdinpart and rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
118. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2504.
119. Id at 2491. The Court cited the case of Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604-05 n.33
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framework outlined in Roe' 20 and determined that restrictive regulation
affecting the first trimester must be justified by a compelling state interest.
Although the Court acknowledged that certain regulations having no sig-
nificant impact on the exercise of a woman's right are permissible,' 2 ' it
indicated that in no instance may a state interfere in the physician-patient
consultation. 122 The majority concluded that, although a state may rea-
sonably regulate second-trimester abortions to preserve maternal health,
this discretion does not permit it to enact regulations that depart from "ac-
cepted medical practice."'
123
The Court began its examination of the ordinance by focusing on the
hospitalization requirement. Justice Powell noted that Roe had expressly
listed a second-trimester hospitalization requirement among those it
deemed reasonably related to maternal health. 24 Justice Powell stated,
however, that although this requirement was reasonable at the time Roe
was announced, dramatic increases in the safety of abortion procedures
and evidence that they are safely performed in clinical facilities undercut
the justification for a hospitalization requirement during the entire second
trimester. 125 Instead, Powell asserted that new techniques made clinical
abortions safe through the sixteenth, and perhaps even the eighteenth week
of pregnancy.' 26 Powell reasoned that the greater cost of hospitalization
(1977), in support of this determination. In "halen, the Court upheld New York legislation
requiring the use of official forms as a means of controlling drug traffic. Justice White's
majority opinion rejected arguments that forms were unnecessary in whole or in part to
control drug traffic. Justice White asserted that states have broad latitude in dealing with
problems of local concern and that the statute was not unconstitutional because it had the
effect of inhibiting some patients from seeking needed medical treatment. Whalen, 429 U.S.
at 603. He reasoned that the statute neither denied access to nor deprived any individual of
the right to decide, nor denied him the benefit of his physician's advice to acquire or use
needed medical treatment. Id. Additionally, the majority noted that the statute did not
impose third-party consent on the physician-patient relationship. Id Consequently, the
Court concluded that the impact was insufficient to constitute unconstitutional interference
with any right or liberty granted by the fourteenth amendment. Id at 603-04.
120. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
121. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
122. Id at 2493.
123. Id; see infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
124. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
125. Id at 2496. The Court referred to the relatively recent procedure of dilation and
evacuation (D & E), which involves the insertion of a device through the vagina into the
uterus. The fetus and placental tissue are then removed from the womb by suction.
The Court contrasted this procedure with instillation methods, such as saline amni-
ocentesis, noting that the D & E procedure could be performed up to and through the eight-
eenth week of pregnancy, while instillation procedures cannot generally be performed until
the sixteenth week because the amniotic sac is too small. Id at 2496 n.24.
126. 1d. at 2496 n.24. The Court's conclusions as to the safety of a clinical D & E leave
the authority of the state uncertain. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
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posed a substantial, unjustifiable burden on a woman's access to a safe,
inexpensive, and otherwise accessible abortion.1 27 He stated that this re-
quirement effectively inhibited the bulk of abortions after the first twelve
weeks of pregnancy and, therefore, unreasonably infringed on a woman's
right to an abortion.'28 The Court concluded that a state is obligated to
make a reasonable attempt to limit its regulations' effects to that part of the
second trimester when its legitimate interest in health will be promoted. 1
29
The Court next considered the informed consent provisions. Although
acknowledging that it had upheld an informed consent provision in Dan-
forth, the Court struck down the detailed disclosure requirement of the
Akron ordinance. 3 ° The Court noted that a state may ensure that a wo-
gists (ACOG) standards recommend that abortions after fourteen weeks be limited to hospi-
tals. But the Court's suggestion that the D & E procedure is safe through the eighteenth
week of pregnancy leaves the point at which a state may require hospitalization uncertain.
If the ACOG standards are considered accepted medical practice, then fourteen weeks is the
benchmark.
127. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2495. Roe held only that from approximately the end of the first trimester of
pregnancy, the state may reasonably regulate abortions in order to protect the health of the
mother. Furthermore, the Court set the benchmark for the beginning of the second trimes-
ter in accordance with the then prevailing medical knowledge. Arguably, therefore, Akron
is consistent with Roe. However, prior to Akron the Court had indicated that the trimesters
in Roe were bright lines. In Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp.
894 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (three-judge court), af'd sub nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's
Servs. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981), the Court summarily affirmed a district court holding that
"Roe does not render the constitutionality of second trimester regulations subject to either
the availability of abortions or improvements in medical techniques and skills." Gary-
Northwest, 496 F. Supp. at 901-02.
The Supreme Court in Akron, however, noted that the Gary court had rested its decision
on an alternative ground as well. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2494 n. 18. The Court concluded that
it was not, therefore, bound by precedent on the hospitalization issue. Id. In support of this
conclusion the Court cited Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173, 180-81 (1979) ("a summary affirmance can extend no farther than the precise issues
presented and necessarily decided by those actions"). But see Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2506 n.3
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("the Court simply ignores the fact that the district court in Gary-
Northwest held 'even if the plaintiffs could prove birth more dangerous than early second
trimester D & E abortions,' that would not matter insofar as the constitutionality of the
regulations were concerned"). Id. (quoting Gary-Northwest, 496 F. Supp. 894, 903 (N.D.
Ind. 1980)) (emphasis by Justice O'Connor). For a discussion of whether a summary affirm-
ance is a decision on the merits, see R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE,
321-25 (5th ed. 1978). The authors conclude that "[in determining whether or not to dispose
of an appeal summarily, the Court must . . . consider . . . the merits . I..." Id  at 325.
130. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2502. The Court's holding in this respect is confusing since, in
Matheson, it indicated that identical requirements were permissible:
Utah also provides by statute that no abortion may be performed unless a "vol-
untary and informed written consent" is first obtained by the attending physician
from the patient. In order for such a consent to be "voluntary and informed," the
patient must be advised at a minimum about available adoption services, about
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man's consent to an abortion is made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences.' 3 ' This freedom, however, does not allow the state unfet-
tered discretion to decide what information should be disclosed. Instead,
the Court construed Danforth to vest the physician with ultimate authority
in this determination.' 32 The majority distinguished the Akron provision
from the one in Danforth, contending that the information required was
designed to dissuade the woman from granting consent, rather than ensur-
ing that her consent was informed.' 33 Justice Powell concluded that the
mandated disclosures posed unreasonable obstacles in the path of the phy-
sician upon whom the woman relied for advice.' 34 The Court then as-
sessed another aspect of informed consent-the identity of the individual
required to make the disclosure.
The Akron ordinance required the physician to disclose, in addition to
the detailed information, the risks peculiar to the woman's own preg-
nancy.135 The Court determined that the mandated disclosures under this
provision allowed the physician constitutionally adequate discretion in
treating his patient. 13 6 Nonetheless, the Court struck down the provision
because it constrained the physician's practice of medicine in another as-
pect-it required that he make the disclosure in person.' Although the
Court expressly acknowledged its past emphasis on the physician's role in
consulting with his patient, it stated that there was no convincing reason
for requiring him to make the disclosure personally. The Court reasoned
that the critical factor was whether or not the patient obtained the neces-
sary information. 13  Justice Powell identified only one objection to the
requirements, and that was potentially increased Cost. ' 1  Justice Powell
fetal development, and about foreseeable complications and risks of an abortion.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305 (1978). In PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL
Mo. v. DANFORTH . . . we rejected a constitutional attack on written consent
provisions.
450 U.S. at 400 n. 1 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
131. 103 S. Ct. at 2499.
132. Id.
133. Id The Court noted that detailed descriptions of the anatomical development of
the fetus would involve, at best, speculation, but failed to explain why a physician's determi-
nation of viability is any less speculative.
134. Id at 2501.
135. See supra note 104.
136. 103 S. Ct. at 2501.
137. Id at 2502.
138. Id
139. Despite the Court's repeated references to accepted medical practices, Justice Pow-
ell states that:
[rlequiring physicians personally to discuss the abortion decision, its health risks,
and consequences with each patient may in some cases add to the cost of providing
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concluded that the state's legitimate interest that a woman's consent be
informed is limited to the ability to require the attending physician to ver-
ify that adequate counseling has taken place.'
40
Regarding the validity of the twenty-four hour waiting period, Justice
Powell noted that there had been no evidence at trial suggesting that this
provision would enhance the safety of the abortion procedure.' 4' He also
expressed doubts that the waiting period would render the woman's deci-
sion any more informed.' 42 Instead, Justice Powell propounded the view
that the decision to delay an abortion belongs to the physician in the exer-
cise of his medical judgment. 43 The Court concluded that after the appro-
priate counseling a woman who is prepared to consent to an abortion
cannot be required to wait to obtain it.'"
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, dissented,
arguing that the Court's analysis comported neither with previous abortion
decisions nor with the Court's approach in other areas of fundamental
rights. 14  Justice O'Connor began her dissent with sharp criticism of the
trimester approach to abortion jurisprudence, labeling it unworkable and
unable to accommodate mutually antagonistic rights and interests.' 46 She
rejected the Court's holding that advancements in medical technology had
decreased the state's discretion in confining second trimester abortions to
abortions, though the record here does not suggest that ethical physicians will
charge more for adhering to this typical element of the physician-patient relationship.
Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id at 2502. The Court acknowledged that the state may set reasonable minimum
qualifications for clinical counseling staffs. For a discussion of problems related to clinical
counseling staff, see infra note 197 and accompanying text.
141. 103 S. Ct. at 2503. At trial the arguments offered in support of this provision were
not aimed at physical safety. The Court, however, sidestepped the issue of psychological
benefits inherent in this provision. Compare the Court's holding here with the ACOG stan-
dards mentioned at infra note 162.
142. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2503.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2504. Justice O'Connor cited various Supreme Court decisions to support the
proposition that the level of state interference must be substantial before the Court will
apply heightened scrutiny in fundamental rights analysis. Id. at 2510; see, e.g., Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977) (strict scrutiny appropriate only where
the state law interferes with "an individual's right to prevent conception or terminate preg-
nancy by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating [the] decision"); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (legislation subject to strict
scrutiny only when it deprives, infringes or interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or personal liberty); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539,
545 (1963) (concerning first amendment rights, legislation must "infringe substantially" on
the protected conduct); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("significant
encroachment upon personal liberty" is required).
146. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2505.
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hospitals. O'Connor asserted that despite the majority's claimed adher-
ence to the Roe framework it had blurred the bright lines drawn by that
decision. 47 The dissent noted that advancements in medical technology
will inexorably delay the point at which the state's interest in maternal
health becomes compelling. Conversely, science increasingly would ad-
vance that point of viability and, consequently, the point at which the state
may proscribe nontherapeutic abortions to preserve fetal life. Thus per-
ceived, the dissent concluded that the Roe framework was "on a collision
course with itself." 148 The dissent underscored its criticism of the majority
in maintaining that the Roe framework was not built upon a foundation of
neutral principles that could either withstand the test of time or command
the respect of stare decisis.
149
The critical flaw in the Court's analysis, according to the dissent, was the
absolute negation of any state interest prior to a compelling point. 150 To
illustrate her point, Justice O'Connor emphasized that potential life is no
less potential in the early weeks of pregnancy than it is from viability on-
wards.' 1 She insisted that a state's interests in maternal health and fetal
life were compelling throughout the entire pregnancy. Consequently, the
inquiry of the Court should be limited to determining whether or not legis-
lation constituted an undue burden or an absolute obstacle to a woman's
freedom to decide.'52 Justice O'Connor maintained that only substantial
state interference such as an absolute prohibition or a severe restraint on a
woman's access to an abortion,'53 has been deemed significant enough to




Justice O'Connor rejected the Court's conclusion that increased cost
alone constituted an undue burden on the abortion right. The dissent
noted that any regulation, including licensing requirements, involves in-
creased costs.' 55 The dissent asserted that the hospitalization requirement
was justified by the state's interest in the woman's health, including "all
147. Id. at 2506.
148. Id at 2507. Justice O'Connor determined that, under the majority's opinion, "the
State must continuously and conscientiously study contemporary medical and scientific
literature in order to determine whether the effect of a particular regulation is to 'depart
from accepted medical practice' insofar as particular procedures and particular periods
within the trimester are concerned." Id at 2506.
149. Id. at 2508.
150. Id
151. Id at 2509.
152. Id
153. Id at 2510; see supra note 145.
154. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2511.
155. Id at 2512. The dissent claimed that the Court's holding in a companion case to
Akron, Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. at 2532, 2536 (1983), which upheld stringent li-
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factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age-[that are] relevant to the well being of the patient."' 56 They con-
cluded that the hospitalization requirement was rationally related to a le-
gitimate state interest.
157
Justice O'Connor also rejected the Court's disposition of the informed
consent provisions. Observing that the detailed disclosure provision was
not before the Court, the dissenting justices criticized the majority for
striking down the requirement that the attending physician make the dis-
closure personally." 8 The dissent contended that this ruling was contrary
to the Court's upholding of the informed consent provision in Danforth. "
Justice O'Connor concluded that no undue burden or drastic limitation
was imposed by the requirement and that it did not significantly affect any
privacy right under the fourteenth amendment.
160
The majority opinion was also criticized for failing to uphold the
twenty-four hour waiting period. Justice O'Connor stated that the Court's
determination that the decision to delay should remain within the confines
of the physician-patient relationship was difficult to understand since the
trial record demonstrated that none existed. 16 1 She also emphasized that
the expert medical standards relied upon heavily by the Court recom-
mended sufficient time for reflection in order to make an informed consent
that explores all options and risks. 162 The dissent contended that no in-
creased risk factor was created by this requirement as it specifically ex-
cepted situations involving medical emergencies. 163 Justice O'Connor
concluded that increased cost neither unduly burdened nor absolutely pre-
cluded an abortion. Even assuming an undue burden, she maintained, the
waiting provision was justified by compelling state interests in maternal
censing requirements for facilities performing abortions, would also entail additional costs.
Thus, the dissent indicated that Simopoulos and Akron are inconsistent.
156. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2512 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
157. 103 S. Ct. at 2512-13.
158. Id. at 2513-14.
159. Id.
160. Justice O'Connor maintained that the undue burden requirement represented the
threshold inquiry into the justification for the exacting "compelling state interest" standard.
Id at 2512-13. But see supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
161. See Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2515-16.
162. The ACOG standards, upon which the Court relied so heavily, recommend that
"[p]rior to abortion, the woman should have access to special counseling that explores op-
tions for the management of unwanted pregnancy, examines the risks, and allows sufficient
timefor reflection prior to making an informed decision. " Id at 2516 (emphasis added) (citing
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, STANDARDS FOR OBSTET-
RIc-GYNECOLOGIC SERVICES 54 (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ACOG Standards]).
163. Id. The majority acknowledged this exception as well. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2502
n.42.
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health, including its physical and emotional aspects, as well as in the pro-
tection of fetal life.
164
III. AKRON'S NEW ANALYSIS: FURTHER RETRENCHMENT
ON STATE AUTHORITY
The Akron Court stated that legislative responses to the Court's decision
in Roe and a consequent need to refine the limits of state regulation of
abortions prompted its decision. 65 TheAkron Court considered the state-
ment in Roe that a woman may choose and obtain an abortion "free of
interference by the state." The Court held that even minor regulation of
the abortion procedure during the first trimester must not interfere with
either the woman's choice between abortion and childbirth or the physi-
cian-patient consultation. 166 Furthermore, with respect to the second tri-
mester, the Court in Akron observed that the ability of the state to impose
regulations reasonably designed to protect maternal health did not grant it
the discretion to depart from accepted medical practice. 67 Thus the Ak-
ron holding indicates that the medical community, at least in the context
of first- and second-trimester abortions, has broad discretion to determine
the limits of its own authority. This holding, however, raises the question
of what authority remains in the state to regulate the performance of abor-
tions. If the majority intended to define state authority solely in terms of
accepted medical practice in the second trimester, while forbidding a1 reg-
ulations in the first trimester which relate to the abortion procedure or the
physician-patient consultation, then the dissent is correct in stating that
Akron constitutes a departure from precedent.
In Danforth, Bellotti I1 and Matheson the Court confronted permissible
distinctions between abortions and other medical procedures, Danforth
upheld the informed consent provision in recognition of the stressful na-
ture involved in a medical procedure that terminates a potential life and
the detrimental impact which that stress exerts on a woman's ability to
make an aware, deliberate decision.' 6  Bellotti II confronted the state's
interest vis-a-vis minors, with the plurality indicating that a minor's imma-
turity brings substantially into question his ability to make a quality deci-
164. Id. at 2516.
165. Id at 2493.
166. Id at 2491-92.
167. Id.
168. Cf Danforth, 428 U.S. at 66. Danforth indicates that the Court places an extremely
high value on the ability of women to make their own choices concerning abortion. Note,
Due Process Privacy and the Path of Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 469, 504.
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sion.'6 9 The plurality concluded that in regard to a minor, the state is
justified in intervening and constructing an elaborate mechanism that bal-
ances expediency against a concern that the abortion decision be well
made. ' 7 Given the Bellottill decision that the state's concern with a wo-
man's psychological health justified intrusion into the decision making
process, it was foreseeable that, given the appropriate justification, a state
may intervene in the implementation of the abortion decision. This was
the situation in Matheson."' Throughout these opinions the Court has
recognized that the woman's right does not exist to the exclusion of all
state interests.'17 In Akron, however, the Court denotes a significant re-
treat from this position by curtailing the authority of a state to further its
legitimate interests and placing broad discretion in the hands of the medi-
cal community. This shift in approach can be understood by the differing
standards of review employed in Akron and in the decisions preceding it.
Much of Akron's rhetoric comports with that found in prior abortion
decisions, as well as other areas of fundamental rights analysis. Specifi-
cally, the analysis applied in the privacy rights cases requires that state
action interfere significantly with the exercise of the protected right before
the Court will subject it to strict scrutiny. 173 Similarly, theAkron decision
purports to recognize that regulations having no significant impact need
not be supported by a compelling state interest.1 74 Rather, these actions
may be upheld on a showing of only an important state interest in the
woman's health. Yet Akron further holds that even minor abortion regula-
169. The Bellotti 11 Court was particularly concerned that "[tihe abortion decision has
implications far broader than those associated with most other kinds of medical treatment."
443 U.S. 622, 649.
170. For a discussion of the Bellotti H1 opinion, see supra notes 78-96 and accompanying
text. The concern of states in enacting parental notice statutes is that the decision to abort be
well made:
Because many minors lack the capacity to make intelligent, informed decisions,
the minor may not be able to give effective consent. The right to decide presup-
poses capacity to decide, and absent capacity, the right to decide is meaningless,
and perhaps harmful. . . . Abortion clinics are unlikely to discourage the minor's
decision to abort or in other ways act contrary to their financial interest.
Note, Parental Notice Statutes.- Permissible State Regulation of a Minor's Abortion Decision,
49 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 99-100 (1980).
171. For a discussion of Matheson, see supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
172. "The privacy right involved. . . cannot be said to be absolute." Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
173. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). In Zablocki, Justice Marshall, writing
for the majority stated: "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with deci-
sions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." Id at 386. Com-
pare Zablocki's holding requiring significant interference with the determination in Akron
that even minor regulations are impermissible.
174. 103 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
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tions may interfere with neither the physician-patient consultation, nor the
woman's choice.175 A particularly perplexing question raised by Akron
then becomes how a state distinguishes between a constitutionally insignif-
icant regulation and an unconstitutional minor one. Realistically, the fact
that a minor regulation can be unconstitutional suggests that the Court has
discarded the traditional requirement of significant interference, thereby
elevating the abortion right to a preferred status among other consitutional
rights. 1
76
The Akron Court's determination that even minor first-trimester regula-
tions of abortions are unconstitutional indicates that certain aspects of the
right are, by their nature, immune to any state action. The Court in Akron
claimed that it merely reaffirmed the principles of Roe and its progeny.
77
Under Roe, however, the state may reasonably regulate abortions in order
to protect maternal health. 78 Moreover, Doe refined the concept of health
to include physical, emotional and familial factors, as well as considera-
tions of the woman's age, 179 thereby granting a broad definition of the
state's interests. Finally, the Danforth Court expressly recognized that the
state's interest would support legislation applied to the first trimester, even
where such legislation related to the physician-patient consultation. 80
Thus the Court's claim in Akron that even minor regulations in this area
are impermissible is not accurate. Moreover, the indication in Akron that
certain aspects of the abortion right are immune to state action is not con-
sistent with the analysis applied in previous cases.'
8'
Danforth upheld first-trimester regulation where there was "no legally
significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision or the physi-
cian-patient relationship."'' 82 Although the phraseology varies between
175. Id
176. Strict judicial scrutiny will not be imposed where state action is not restrictive of
protected conduct. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (purchase
of contraceptives); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (right to
travel); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (right to an educa-
tion); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (rights under first amendment).
177. 103 S. Ct. at 2487.
178. Id at 2492.
179. 410 U.S. at 192.
180. See § 161.2, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 716 (1977) (Danforth establishes the principle that
the balancing test must be applied to statutes affecting the the woman's right in the first
trimester).
181. See, e.g., the Court's statement in Roe that "it is not clear to us that the claim as-
serted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases
bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's deci-
sions." Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
182. 428 U.S. at 81.
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significant impact and undue burden, 18 3 the import of this analysis is clear:
the constitutional validity of abortion legislation depends on the degree of
its impact and the justification for it.'" 4 In Danforth the Court was able to
uphold concededly minor regulations applied to adults, even in the first
trimester. Where applied to minors, the Court has found that even a re-
strictive regulation may be justified by less then a compelling state interest,
as demonstrated in both Bellotti II and Matheson . s' Thus, prior to Akron
the Court engaged in balancing between a state's interference with a wo-
man's right to have an abortion and the state's interest in safeguarding the
woman's health.' 6 Had the Court continued this analysis in Akron, it is
likely that certain aspects of this case would have been decided differently.
Although the requirement that a physician disclose a set list of detailed
information may have gone beyond the state's authority envisioned under
Danforth,'S precedent supported the provision mandating that he person-
183. Compare id with Bellotti 1, 428 U.S. at 147. The Court in Danforth upheld the
recordkeeping requirement because it did not significantly interfere with the woman's right.
In Bellottil, however, the Court stated that Danforth upheld the informed consent provision
because it did not unduly burden the protected right.
184. Bellotl 1, 428 U.S. at 150.
185. For a discussion of the justification for the regulations in Matheson, see supra note
110 and accompanying text. The BellottiII Court included among its reasons for endorsing
abortion regulations for minors the "profound moral and religious concerns." 443 U.S. at
640.
186. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
187. The Court noted that in Danforth it had construed informed consent to mean "the
giving of information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its conse-
quences. To ascribe more meaning than this might well confine the attending physician in
an undesired and uncomfortable straight jacket in the practice of his profession." Akron,
103 S. Ct. at 2499 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67). The Court did not deny the state
authority to ensure the decision is made "in light of all attendant circumstances-psycholog-
ical and emotional as well as physical-that might be relevant to the well-being of the pa-
tient,"4kron, 103 S. Ct. at 2499-500 (quoting Colantti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394 (1979)),
but concluded that the state's interest does not provide it with unreviewable authority to
determine the precise information a woman must be given prior to the abortion.
It is possible to construe the Court's language as an admonition to states that they not
"straightjacket" a physician by legislating details required to be disclosed. If such is the
Court's intention, then its authority in the area of informed consent may be as narrow as it is
in the determination of fetal viability. For a discussion of the limitations on state authority
in determining the point at which the fetus is viable, see supra note 4.
However, the key element that rendered the 4kron statute unconstitutional was the inflex-
ible, mandatory nature of the disclosures. The Court determined that the disclosure consti-
tuted obstacles placed in the path of the physician on whom the woman is entitled to rely for
advice. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2499-501. However, the Court did recognize that adequate
counseling does not consist merely of a recital of pertinent medical facts. In addition, it
recognized that the needs of each patient will vary considerably. Thus, the Court stated that
individual counseling "should be available for those persons who desire or need it." Id at
2502 n.38.
In light of this language, it is possible to read Akron to permit states to require facilities to
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ally counsel his patient. In halen, the Court stated that the physician's
right is merely derivative and that regulations making his work more labo-
rious and less independent with no impact on the patient are not unconsti-
tutional. 188 This determination suggests that Akron has misconstrued the
privacy right as previously articulated. Arguably, personal counseling by
the physician does not impact at all on the woman's right to decide. Al-
though personal counseling requires more effort on the physician's part
and makes him somewhat less independent, it does not interfere with the
physician-patient relationship. Rather it merely seeks to ensure that one
exists.' 89 Although the Akron Court indicated that an ethical physician
would not charge more for this "typical element of the physician-patient
relationship," the majority stated that such a requirement might increase
the cost of an abortion. 9 ° Thus, the Akron Court subordinates the state's
effort to ensure the existence of a physician-patient relationship on the pos-
sibility that some incremental cost may be involved. Similarly, the Court
in Akron invalidates the twenty-four hour waiting period because of a pos-
sibility that some health risks may be involved.' 9' The Court's concern
here, however, is not easily understandable since the physician could
waive the requirement upon determining that the woman would be subject
to additional health risk.' 9z Therefore, the aspect of the delay itself re-
mains the only impact on the woman. In Doe, however, the Court ex-
inquire of a woman whether or not she desires more extensive counseling. A state might
even require the counselor to inform a woman what information is available to her in gen-
eral terms, so long as the woman retains the discretion of refusing such information. Thus a
state might require, for example, that the counselor inform the woman that information
concerning fetal development is available if she desires it to be disclosed.
188. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
189. See Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1217 (6th Cir. 1981) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
The requirement that the information specified in .06(C) be given by a physician
does no more than seek to ensure that there is in fact a true physician-patient rela-
tionship even for the woman who goes to an abortion clinic. The evidence
presented at trial showed that the decision to terminate a pregnancy was made not
by the woman in conjunction with her physician, but by the woman and lay em-
ployees of the abortion clinic, the income of which is dependent upon the woman's
choosing to have an abortion. The testimony disclosed that the doctors at Akron
Center's clinic did little, if any, counseling before seeing the patient in the proce-
dure room. Akron's ordinance simply takes into account these realities of the
"physician-patient" relationship at an abortion clinic.
190. 103 S. Ct. at 2502.
191. Id at 2503.
192. Id at 2503 n.42. "This provision does not apply if the physician certifies in writing
that 'there is an emergency need for an abortion to be performed or induced such that con-
tinuation of the pregnancy poses an immediate threat and grave risk to the life or physical
health of the pregnant woman.'"
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pressly rejected the contention that delay alone was not an
unconstitutional restraint: "If higher risk was incurred because of abor-
tions in the second rather than the first trimester, much of that risk was due
to delay in application, and not to the alleged cumbersomeness of the sys-
tem."' 93 This statement indicates that a regulation causing delay, which
by itself, does not increase risk to the woman is constitutional. Because the
waiting period provision does not create risks, it is likely that under Dan-
forth it would have been upheld.
The Danforth Court conceded that the abortion decision is a stressful
one and that it is imperative that it be made with the full knowledge of its
nature and consequences. 94 As a corollary to that right, the Court has
stated that a woman has at least an equal right to decide to carry her preg-
nancy to term as to end it by abortion. 95 Under the ethical standards of
the profession a physician is charged with advising a woman to delay an
abortion if he deems it to be in her best interests. The question of whether
the abortion counseling staff at a clinic will adhere to such professional
standards is problematic. Evidence presented at trial demonstrated that
the income of these counselors was dependent upon the woman choosing
to have an abortion.1
96
With this concern in mind, it is easier to understand why the ordinance
in.Akron included the informed consent and the waiting period provisions.
These requirements manifest a concern that the woman make the decision
free of any coercive influences brought to bear upon her by either the pro-
fessional biases of the medical community or the economic incentives of
the clinics and their counselors. What the Akron Court suggests is that
such concerns are beyond the purview of state authority. Therefore, al-
though the clinical setting may compel a woman in an already stressful
situation toward an inappropriate decision, the state may exert no counter-
vailing influence on the woman's informed choice between childbirth and
abortion. 197 As a consequence Akron leaves the medical community with
193. 410 U.S. at 198-99; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
194. 428 U.S. at 67.
195. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1976) (quoting Skinner v. ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
196. See supra note 189.
197. See, e.g., Proposed Constitutional Amendments, Hearings on SJ Res. 119 and SJ
Res. 130 Before Subcomm. on ConstitutionalAmendments ofthe Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, at 468-72 (1974) (abortion clinics not likely to act against their own
self interests); Note, Parent, Child, and The Decision to Abort: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Statutory Proposal in Bellotti v. Baird, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1869, 1905 n.241 (1979)
("abortion clinics do not profit by decisions not to abort, so little incentive exists for discour-
aging abortions"); Wood & Durham, Counseling, Consulting and Consent Abortion and the
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broad discretion during the first trimester. Akron's analysis of second-tri-
mester regulation seemingly accomplishes much the same result.
Under Roe the state is permitted to enact abortion regulations that rea-
sonably relate to the protection of maternal health. Akron's holding that a
state's discretion in this respect does not permit it to depart from accepted
medical practice in essence defines reasonableness in those terms.
Throughout all of the abortion decisions the Court has consistently ad-
hered to the three-trimester approach. Akron's attempt to carve out an
exception to this approach, while continuing to propound that it has left it
intact, is unconvincing. The majority distinguishes Akron from the hold-
ing in Roe by examining the standards set for clinical abortions by medical
associations. As modern standards permit clinical abortions at the four-
teenth or sixteenth week, the state is now prohibited from restricting those
abortions after the twelfth week.' 9 8 Nonetheless, the Akron Court pur-
portedly maintains that a state need not fine tune its legislation and that
the trimester analysis is still in full force. 199 Whatever validity this reason-
ing may have depends upon the meaning of accepted medical practice.
Since as "accepted medical practice" has never before appeared in any
abortion decision, its meaning is uncertain. Furthermore, Akron does not
explicitly define the term. By implication, however, the standards set by
the various medical associations so frequently referred to in Akron are de-
terminative.2" With respect to the hospitalization of women having abor-
tions performed after a particular point in a pregnancy, the Akron Court
Doctor Patient Relationship, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REV. 783-84. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 91 n.2
(Stewart, J., concurring); see also supra note 189.
198. The Court concluded that requiring hospitalization for all post-first trimester abor-
tions had "the effect of inhibiting ... the vast majority of abortions after the first twelve
weeks." Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79). However, the Court
in Danforth used this language in objecting to an abortion regulation that required abortions
to be performed by methods more dangerous than the one forbidden. See supra notes 56-58
and accompanying text.
199. The Court continues to maintain that the state's interest in maternal health becomes
compelling at "approximately the end of the first trimester." Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2492 n. 11.
The Court stated:
We think it prudent, however, to retain Roe's identification of the beginning of
the second trimester as the approximate time at which the State's interest in mater-
nal health becomes sufficiently compelling to justify significant regulation of abor-
tion ....
The Roe trimester standard thus continues to provide a reasonable legal frame-
work for limiting a State's authority to regulate abortions. Where the State adopts
a health regulation governing the performance of abortions during the second tri-
mester, the determinative question should be whether there is a reasonable medical
basis for the regulation.
Id. at 2492 n. 11.
200. See, e.g., ACOG Standards, supra note 162; American Public Health Association
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adhered to determinations made by those organizations that clinical abor-
tions were safe after either fourteen or sixteen weeks. 20 1 The concept of
safety in these standards, however, was related to the physical aspect only.
Thus, Akron suggests a retreat from the broader definition underlying the
Danforth, Bellotti II, and Matheson decisions.2 °2 Moreover, the standards
of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists state that
"[r]egardless of advances in abortion technology, midtrimester termina-
tions will likely remain more hazardous, expensive, and emotionally dis-
turbing for a woman than early abortions.,, 20 3 This suggests another shift
in the Court's standards. Under Roe "[tihe State has a legitimate interest
in seeing that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is performed
under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient."204
In addition to disregarding the emotional aspects of abortion so care-
fully examined in Danforth, Bellotti II, and Matheson, Akron suggests that
states may never require more than the minimum standards set by medical
associations. The only apparent limit on the discretion of these medical
association standards is that they may not be dispositive where the mortal-
ity rate for abortions exceeds that of normal childbirth.20 5
Ultimately, the majority, while claiming to preserve the practical conse-
quences of Doe, creates its own set of practical problems and uncertainty
as to the continued validity of the Roe framework. As Akron does not
permit state action designed to set minimum standards for the integrity of
the physician-patient relationship, it suggests that only the physical aspects
of the woman's health are relevant to the state's interest. This state interest
is defined in terms of accepted medical practice as determined in the sec-
ond trimester by the medical association standards. These standards, in
turn, are set in accordance with concerns of physical health and the rela-
tive mortality rates of abortion and childbirth.2 °" Thus, as medical science
Recommended Program Guide for Abortion Services (Revised 1979), AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
652 (1980).
201. Akron leaves unclear the point at which the state's interest becomes compelling (cit-
ing ACOG Standards, the Court notes that they recommend abortions be limited to fourteen
weeks where performed in an outpatient clinic or a physician's office). The Court also notes,
however, that those same standards indicate that such abortions may be safe as late as the
eighteenth week of pregnancy. 103 S. Ct. at 2496.
202. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
203. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2506-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting AMERICAN COL-
LEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, TECHNICAL BULLETIN No. 56: METHODS
OF MIDTRIMESTER ABORTION (Dec. 1979)).
204. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (emphasis added).
205. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975) (per curiam).
206. But see Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983). In Ashcroft
the Court confronted a Missouri statute requiring a microscopic pathology report on aborted
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advances to the point in pregnancy where abortion is safer than childbirth,
the state will be unable to regulate. The compelling interest of the state
will be increasingly diminished. Faced with an altered analysis affected by
accepted medical practice, Justice O'Connor concluded that the Roe
framework was "on a collision course with itself. '20 7 Akron, according to
Justice O'Connor, does not explain why a state's concern with a woman's
emotional, mental, and physical health will no longer adequately justify
abortion regulation. This is of special note since the standards so heavily
relied upon indicate that midtrimester abortions are more hazardous. 20
8
The Akron Court also fails to explain why the abortion right deserves spe-
cial constitutional treatment. Specifically, Akron does not explain why the
traditional requirement of "significant interference" is discarded in the
abortion analysis. The distinctions drawn by the Court in Akron undercut
the conclusion in Roe that abortion is in all aspects a medical procedure.
Now, abortion is not treated as other medical procedures because the state
may not ensure the maximum safety it can in other medical procedures.
Moreover, abortion is subject to a preferred constitutional analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
Akron uses the privacy right to restrict state regulation of the medical
community involved in performing abortions. The standards Akron ap-
plies, however, are inappropriate under prior constitutional analysis. The
Court applies strict scrutiny to even minor state regulations of the abortion
procedure and the physician-patient consultation. This suggests that the
Constitution affords abortion special protection over and above that given
other constitutional rights. In addition, Akron's determination that ac-
cepted medical practice sets the bounds of state authority in the second
trimester marks the decline of the trimester approach adopted under Roe.
tissue for each abortion performed at an abortion clinic. Despite the fact that ACOG stan-
dards made pathological examinations of abortion tissue permissive rather than mandatory,
the Court upheld the judgment. Writing a separate opinion, Justice Powell noted that it was
accepted medical practice to submit surgically removed tissue to an examination by a
pathologist. Id. at 2523. In a footnote, Justice Powell explained the rationale behind his
opinion by noting that the ACOG's standard had been subject to a recent policy change. He
examined the history of the recommendation and discovered that an ACOG survey of
twenty-nine abortion clinics disclosed that a majority performed microscopic pathology re-
ports in all cases. Id. at 2523 n. 11. Thus Justice Powell's opinion suggests that accepted
medical practice may be determined by the norms prevailing at abortion clinics. That por-
tion of Justice Powell's opinion is not binding precedent, however, because, although five
Justices concurred in the judgment, only Chief Justice Burger joined in that part of the
opinion.
207. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2507.
208. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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As accepted medical practice relates primarily to factors concerning physi-
cal health only, Akron eliminates state interest in regulating the conduct of
both physicians and abortion clinics in a stressful abortion situation.
The shift in focus evidenced by Akron suggests that the right is no longer
that of the woman in consultation with her physician to choose whether or
not to have an abortion. Instead, Akron emphasizes a right pertaining to
"women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe
abortion procedure." 2" Ease in access, therefore, has replaced the concern
that the decision be made freely and without coercive influences on the
woman.
Paul Win. Bridenhagen
209. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
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